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Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion
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| Authors and Corporations: | |
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| Type of Resource: | E-Book |
| Language: | English |
| published: |
[Ottawa]
Bank of Canada
[2019]
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| Series: |
Bank of Canada: Staff working paper ; 2019, 10 (February 2019)
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| Source: | Verbunddaten SWB Lizenzfreie Online-Ressourcen |
| Notes: | Zusammenfassung in französischer Sprache |
| Summary: | This paper studies how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on a sender's information. I study a game in which, prior to the sender's information disclosure, the designer can restrict the most informative signal that the sender can generate. In the binary action case, I consider arbitrary preferences of the designer and characterize all equilibrium outcomes. As a corollary, I solve a problem of how to maximize a receiver's payoffs by restricting the sender's information: Whenever the designer can increase the receiver's payoffs by restricting the sender's information, the receiver-optimal way coincides with an equilibrium of the game in which the receiver persuades the sender. |
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| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten); Illustrationen |
| Notes: | Zusammenfassung in französischer Sprache |