Further processing options
Common ownership and market entry: evidence from the pharmaceutical industry
Saved in:
| Authors and Corporations: | , , |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | Seldeslachts, Jo [Author] • Banal-Estañol, Albert 1976- [Author] |
| Edition: | This version: November 13, 2019 |
| Type of Resource: | E-Book |
| Language: | English |
| published: |
Berlin
DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research
2019
|
| Series: |
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: Discussion papers ; 1738 [rev.]
|
| Source: | Verbunddaten SWB Lizenzfreie Online-Ressourcen |
| Summary: | Common ownership - where two firms are partially owned by the same investor - and its impact on product markets has recently drawn attention. This paper focuses on implications for entry. We consider the entry decisions of generic pharmaceutical firms into drug markets opened up by the end of regulatory protection in the US.We provide a framework that shows that greater common ownership between the brand firm and a potential generic entrant reduces the likelihood that this generic enters. We then extend this prediction to show that higher overall common ownership between the brand and all potential generic entrants at the market level leads to fewer generic entrants. We find robust evidence for these predictions: a one-standard-deviation increase in common ownership decreases the probability of individual entry by 9-13%, whereas a one-standard-deviation increase in market-level common ownership decreases the total number of entrants by 11-13% in that market. |
|---|---|
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten); Illustrationen |