A general framework for studying contests

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Bibliographic Details
Authors and Corporations:	Bastani, Spencer (Author), Giebe, Thomas (Author), Gürtler, Oliver (Author)
Other Authors:	Giebe, Thomas 1974- [Author] • Gürtler, Oliver 1978- [Author]
Type of Resource:	E-Book
Language:	English
published:	Munich, Germany CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute [2019]
Series:	CESifo GmbH: CESifo working papers ; no. 7993 (December 2019)
Subjects:	contest theory symmetric equilibrium heterogeneity risk decision theory Graue Literatur
Source:	Verbunddaten SWB Lizenzfreie Online-Ressourcen

Description
Summary:	We develop a general framework to study contests, containing the well-known models of Tullock (1980) and Lazear & Rosen (1981) as special cases. The contest outcome depends on players' effort and skill, the latter being subject to symmetric uncertainty. The model is tractable, because a symmetric equilibrium exists under general assumptions regarding production technologies and skill distributions. We construct a link between our contest model and expected utility theory and exploit this link to revisit important comparative statics results of contest theory and show how these can be overturned. Finally, we apply our results to study optimal workforce composition.
Physical Description:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten)