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Assessing EU merger control through compensating efficiencies

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Bibliographic Details
Authors and Corporations: Affeldt, Pauline Luise (Author), Duso, Tomaso (Author), Gugler, Klaus (Author), Piechucka, Joanna (Author)
Other Authors: Duso, Tomaso [Author] • Gugler, Klaus 1971- [Author] • Piechucka, Joanna [Author]
Type of Resource: E-Book
Language: English
published:
Series: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: Discussion papers ; 1979
Subjects:
Compensating efficiencies
Efficiency gains
Merger control
Concentration,Screens
HHI
Mergers
Unilateral Effects
Market Definition
Entry barriers
Graue Literatur
Source: Verbunddaten SWB
Lizenzfreie Online-Ressourcen
Description
Summary: Worldwide, the overwhelming majority of large horizontal mergers are cleared by antitrust authorities unconditionally. The presumption seems to be that efficiencies from these mergers are sizeable. We calculate the compensating efficiencies that would prevent a merger from harming consumers for 1,014 mergers affecting 12,325 antitrust markets scrutinized by the European Commission between 1990 and 2018. Compensating efficiencies seem too large to be achievable for many mergers. Barriers to entry and the number of firms active in the market are the most important factors determining their size. We highlight concerns about the Commission's merger enforcement being too lax.
Physical Description: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten); Illustrationen