In a world with many targets, one-dimensional target indicators will always be bypassed

Saved in:

Authors and Corporations:

Wagner, Gert G. (Author)

Type of Resource:

E-Book

Language:

English

published:

Berlin DIW Berlin, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung 2021

Series:

Subjects:

rule-binding

Champbell

Goodhart's Law

Hobbes

Graue Literatur

Source:

Verbunddaten SWB
Lizenzfreie Online-Ressourcen

Description
Summary:	It is striking that economists in particular firmly believe in the benefits of rule-binding, even though this belief runs counter to the standard assumption of economic theory that we humans are self-interested and therefore extremely resourceful when it comes to circumventing inconvenient government regulations, e.g. taxes. In Public Choice Theory, politicians are even assumed to have nothing but self-interest as their guiding motive for action. Why then, in this world of thought, should ultra-self-interested politicians of all people adhere to simple rules such as the debt brake instead of bypass them, if – as is also assumed in this model world – all that matters to them is short-term electoral success, for which government debt can be helpful.
Physical Description:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 7 Seiten)