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The Political Economy of Conditional and Unconditional Foreign Assistance: Grants Versus Loan Rollovers
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| Authors and Corporations: | , |
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| Other Authors: | Mayer, Wolfgang [Other] |
| Type of Resource: | E-Book |
| Language: | Undetermined |
| published: | |
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IMF Working Paper
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| Source: | Verbunddaten SWB Lizenzfreie Online-Ressourcen |
| Summary: | Improving the effectiveness of financial assistance programs is a priority of international financial institutions (IFIs). This paper examines the effectiveness of alternative assistance instruments in a dynamic political economy framework. Economic policies of the receiving country are distorted by the influence of a domestic interest group. The assistance-providing IFI aims at reducing these distortions. The IFI provides assistance either as grants or loans, and either conditionally on reducing policy distortions or unconditionally. The paper shows that, other things constant, one-time grants are more effective than loan rollovers when assistance is unconditional, but that the opposite is true when assistance is conditional |
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| Item Description: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 2004 erstellt |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (28 p) |
| DOI: | 10.2139/ssrn.878861 |
| Access: | Open Access |